《The Man Who Solved The Market》中文版翻译连载52

没人会因为数字做出决定 投资者们需要的是一只有故事的股票

《The Man Who Solved The Market》中文版翻译连载52
解决市场的人

The MAn Who Solved The Market (52)

CHAPTER NINE

第九章

No one ever made a decision because

of a number. They need a story.

Daniel KAhneman, economist

没人会因为一个数字做出决定。

他们需要一个故事。

丹尼尔·卡尼曼,经济学家

Jim Simons seemed to have discovered the perfect way to trade commodities, currencies, and bonds: predictIVe mathematical models. Yet, Simons knew, if he wanted Renaissance Technologies to amount to much of anything, he’d have to get his computers to make money in stocks.

吉姆·西蒙斯看起来已经发现了交易商品、货币和债券的完美路径:可预测的数学模型。然而,西蒙斯知道如果他想要文艺复兴科技有所成就,就必须让他的电脑在股票赚钱

It wasn’t clEAr why Simons thought he had a chance of success. The early 1990s was a golden age for fundamental investors, those who generally chat up companies and digest annual reports, financial fillings and statements à la Warren Buffee. These investors tap instinct, cunning, and experience. It was all about brainpower, not computing power. When it came to stocks, Simons seemed well out of his depth.

不清楚西蒙斯为什么认为他有成功的机会。在二十世纪九十年代早期,对于基本面投资者来说是个黄金时代,这些投资者会与公司攀谈了解情况,像沃伦·巴菲特那样消化年报、财务文件和报表。这些投资者利用的是直觉、狡猾和经验。一切都是智力的游戏,而不是计算机算力的比拼。而说到股票,西蒙斯觉得似乎深不可见。

Peter Lynch was paragon of the fundamental approACh. From 1977 to 1990, Lynch’s prescient stock picks helped Fidelity Investments’ Magellan mutual fund grow from a $100 million pip-squeak into a $16 billion power, averaging annual gains of 29 percent, beating the market in eleven of those years. Ignoring historic and overlooked pricing patterns — the stuff Simons obsessed over — Lynch said investors could trounce the market simply by sticking with companies they understood best. “Know what you own” was Lynch’s mantra.

彼得·林奇是基本面分析的典范。从1977年到1990年,林奇的有预见性的选股帮助富达投资的麦哲伦共同基金的规模从微不足道的1亿美元成长到160亿美元的规模,平均年回报率达到了29%,其中11年间跑赢市场。对历史和被忽略的价格模式听而不闻——但这正是西蒙斯所痴迷的——林奇表示投资者们只要坚持投资他们最熟悉的公司,就能击败市场。“知道你有什么”是林奇的口头禅。

Searching for story stocks that he believed would experience surging earnings, Lynch made a killing on Dunkin’ Donuts, the doughnut retailer beloved in Fidelity’s home state of Massachusetts, purchasing shares partly because the company “didn’t have to worry about low-priced Korean imports.” Another time, Lynch’s wife, Carolyn, brought home a pair of L’eggs, a brand of pantyhose that was stuffed into distinctive, egg-shaped plastic containers and sold in supermarket and drugstore checkout aisles. Carolyn loved L’eggs, so her husband did, too, backing up the truck to buy shares of its manufacturer, Hanes, even though most hosiery products at the time were sold in department stores and women’s clothing stores, not in drugstores.

林奇会寻找那些收益能飙升的有故事的股票,他在康恩都乐(Dunkin’ Donuts)上大赚了一笔,这是在富达基金家乡马萨诸塞州备受欢迎的一家甜甜圈零售商,林奇买入的部分原因是公司“不用担心廉价的韩国进口产品。”另一回,林奇的妻子卡罗琳买回家一双L’eggs,这是一个连裤袜的品牌,产品被塞进独特的蛋型塑料容器中,在超市和药店的收银通道出售。卡罗琳喜爱L’eggs,所以她丈夫也喜欢,低档建仓购买了其制造商恒适(Hanes),尽管当时大多数袜产品都是在百货公司和女装店出售,而不是在药店。

“I did a little bit of research,” Lynch later explained. “I found out the average woman goes to the supermarket or a drugstore once a week, and they go to a woman’s specialty store or department store once every six weeks. And all the good hosiery, all the good pantyhose, is being sold in department stores. They were selling junk in the supermarkets.”

“我做了一点研究,”林奇后来解释说。“我发现平均每个女人每周都要去一次超市或药店,但每六周才去一次女士专卖店或百货公司。而且所有好的针织品和连裤袜都在百货商场出售。他们只在超市卖垃圾。”

When a rival brand of pantyhose was introduced, Lynch bought forty-eight pairs and asked employees to test them out, determining they couldn’t match the quality of his L’eggs. Over time, Lynch rode Hanes to a gain of ten times his fund’s initial investment.

当一个竞争品牌的连裤袜出现时,林奇买了48双,要求员工们试穿,以确定质量比不上L’eggs。随着时间推移,林奇凭借恒适获得了初始投资的十倍收益。

Lynch’s most important tool was his telephone, not his computer. He’d regularly call, or sometimes visit, a network of well-placed executives, asking for updates on their businesses, competitors, suppliers, customers, and more. These were legal tactics at the time, even though smaller investors couldn’t access the same information.

林奇最重要的工具就是他的电话,而不是电脑。他会定期打电话,有时候会拜访各家公司的高管们,要求更新他们在业务、竞争对手、供应商、顾客等方面更多的信息。这些在彼时都是合法的策略,尽管小型投资者是得不到同样的信息的。

“The computer won’t tell you (if a business trend) is going to last a month or a year,” Lynch said.

“电脑是不会告诉你一个商业模式能持续一个月还是一年,”林奇说道。

By 1990, one out of every one hundred Americans was invested in Magellan, and Lynch’s book, One Up on Wall Street, sold more than a million copies, inspiring investors to search for stocks “from the supermarket to the workplace.” As Fidelity came to dominate mutual funds, it began sending young analysts to call on hundreds of companies each year. Lynch’s successors, including Jeffrey Vinik, used the trips to gain their own, entirely legal, information advantaged over rivals.

到1990年,每100个美国人中就有一个投资了麦哲伦基金,而林奇的书《在华尔街崛起/彼得林奇的成功投资》卖出了超过一百万本,激发投资者们“从超市到职场”寻找股票。当富达开始主导共同基金领域,开始每年让年轻的分析师们去拜访数百家公司。林奇的继任者,包括杰弗瑞·维尼克,利用这些拜访获得了自己的、完全合法的、领先于对手的信息优势。

“Vinik would ask us to have conversations with cab drivers on our way from and to the airport to get a sense of the local economy or the particular company we were visiting,” recalls J.Dennis Jean-Jacques, who was a Fidelity analyst at the time. “We would also eat in the company cafeteria … or at a nearby restaurant, so we could ask the waiter about the company across the street.”

“维尼克会要求我们在来往机场的路上跟出租车司机聊天,以了解当地的经济情况和我们要拜访的公司的情况,”J·丹尼斯·让-雅克回忆说,他那时候是富达的一名分析师。“我们也要在公司的咖啡厅或附近的餐厅吃饭,这样就能问问服务员关于街对面那家公司的情况。”

As Lynch and Vinik racked up big gains in Boston, Bill Gross was on the other side of the country, on the shores of Newport Beach, California, building a bond empire at a company called Pacific Investment Management Company, or PIMCO. Gross, who paid his way through business school with blackjack winnings after reADIng Ed Thorp’s book on gambling, was especially adept at predicting the direction of global interest rates. He became well known in the financial world for thoughtful, colorful market observations, as well as a unique look. Each day, Gross wore open-collared, custom-made dress shirts with a tie draped loosely around his neck, a style adopted after vigorous exercise and yoga sessions left him overheated and unwilling to knot his tie once in the office.

林奇和维尼克在波士顿积累了大量财富,比尔·格罗斯在美国的另一边,加州的纽波特海滩市的海边,建立起一个债券帝国——太平洋投资管理公司,简称PIMCO。格罗斯在读了爱德华·索普的书之后,靠着玩二十一点赢的钱读完了商学院,他尤其擅长预测全球利率走向。他以深思熟虑和有趣市场见解,独特的外表而闻名于金融界。格罗斯每天都穿着定制的开领正装衬衫,松垮的领带挂在脖子上,剧烈运动和瑜伽课之后导致他觉得特别热,所以养成了一到办公室就不愿意打领带的风格。

Like Simons, Gross used a mathematical approach to dissect his investments, though Gross melded his formulas with a heavy dose of intuition and intelligence. Gross emerged as a true market savantin 1995, after a huge wager on falling interest rates generated gains of 20 percent for his bond mutual fund, which became the largest ever of its kind. Investors crowned him “the Bond King”, a name that would stick as Gross began an extended reign atop debt markets.

像西蒙斯一样,格罗斯采用数学方法去剖析他的投资,虽然他的方程式中混合着大量的直觉和天分。格罗斯在1995年成为一个真正的市场专家,他将巨大赌注压在利率下行上,这给他的债券共同基金带来了20%的收益,一举成为同基金中规模最大的。投资者们称他为“债券之王”,这个被认为是“格罗斯”的名字开始在债券市场上长期占据统治地位。

(免责声明:仅供个人阅读学习及翻译参考。如有不准之处,请留言帮助改进)

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