《The Man Who Solved The Market》中文版翻译连载52
The MAn Who Solved The Market (52)
No one ever made a decision because
of a number. They need a story.
Daniel KAhneman, economist
Jim Simons seemed to have discovered the perfect way to trade commodities, currencies, and bonds: predictIVe mathematical models. Yet, Simons knew, if he wanted Renaissance Technologies to amount to much of anything, he’d have to get his computers to make money in stocks.
It wasn’t clEAr why Simons thought he had a chance of success. The early 1990s was a golden age for fundamental investors, those who generally chat up companies and digest annual reports, financial fillings and statements à la Warren Buffee. These investors tap instinct, cunning, and experience. It was all about brainpower, not computing power. When it came to stocks, Simons seemed well out of his depth.
Peter Lynch was paragon of the fundamental approACh. From 1977 to 1990, Lynch’s prescient stock picks helped Fidelity Investments’ Magellan mutual fund grow from a $100 million pip-squeak into a $16 billion power, averaging annual gains of 29 percent, beating the market in eleven of those years. Ignoring historic and overlooked pricing patterns — the stuff Simons obsessed over — Lynch said investors could trounce the market simply by sticking with companies they understood best. “Know what you own” was Lynch’s mantra.
Searching for story stocks that he believed would experience surging earnings, Lynch made a killing on Dunkin’ Donuts, the doughnut retailer beloved in Fidelity’s home state of Massachusetts, purchasing shares partly because the company “didn’t have to worry about low-priced Korean imports.” Another time, Lynch’s wife, Carolyn, brought home a pair of L’eggs, a brand of pantyhose that was stuffed into distinctive, egg-shaped plastic containers and sold in supermarket and drugstore checkout aisles. Carolyn loved L’eggs, so her husband did, too, backing up the truck to buy shares of its manufacturer, Hanes, even though most hosiery products at the time were sold in department stores and women’s clothing stores, not in drugstores.
林奇会寻找那些收益能飙升的有故事的股票，他在康恩都乐（Dunkin’ Donuts）上大赚了一笔，这是在富达基金家乡马萨诸塞州备受欢迎的一家甜甜圈零售商，林奇的部分原因是公司“不用担心廉价的韩国进口产品。”另一回，林奇的妻子卡罗琳买回家一双L’eggs，这是一个连裤袜的品牌，产品被塞进独特的蛋型塑料容器中，在超市和药店的收银通道出售。卡罗琳喜爱L’eggs，所以她丈夫也喜欢，低档建仓购买了其制造商恒适（Hanes），尽管当时大多数袜 产品都是在百货公司和女装店出售，而不是在药店。
“I did a little bit of research,” Lynch later explained. “I found out the average woman goes to the supermarket or a drugstore once a week, and they go to a woman’s specialty store or department store once every six weeks. And all the good hosiery, all the good pantyhose, is being sold in department stores. They were selling junk in the supermarkets.”
When a rival brand of pantyhose was introduced, Lynch bought forty-eight pairs and asked employees to test them out, determining they couldn’t match the quality of his L’eggs. Over time, Lynch rode Hanes to a gain of ten times his fund’s initial investment.
Lynch’s most important tool was his telephone, not his computer. He’d regularly call, or sometimes visit, a network of well-placed executives, asking for updates on their businesses, competitors, suppliers, customers, and more. These were legal tactics at the time, even though smaller investors couldn’t access the same information.
“The computer won’t tell you (if a business trend) is going to last a month or a year,” Lynch said.
By 1990, one out of every one hundred Americans was invested in Magellan, and Lynch’s book, One Up on Wall Street, sold more than a million copies, inspiring investors to search for stocks “from the supermarket to the workplace.” As Fidelity came to dominate mutual funds, it began sending young analysts to call on hundreds of companies each year. Lynch’s successors, including Jeffrey Vinik, used the trips to gain their own, entirely legal, information advantaged over rivals.
到1990年，每100个人中就有一个投资了麦哲伦基金，而林奇的书《在 崛起/彼得林奇的成功投资》 了超过一百万本，激发投资者们“从超市到职场”寻找股票。当富达开始主导共同基金领域，开始每年让年轻的分析师们去拜访数百家公司。林奇的继任者，包括杰弗瑞·维尼克，利用这些拜访获得了自己的、完全合法的、 于对手的信息优势。
“Vinik would ask us to have conversations with cab drivers on our way from and to the airport to get a sense of the local economy or the particular company we were visiting,” recalls J.Dennis Jean-Jacques, who was a Fidelity analyst at the time. “We would also eat in the company cafeteria … or at a nearby restaurant, so we could ask the waiter about the company across the street.”
As Lynch and Vinik racked up big gains in Boston, Bill Gross was on the other side of the country, on the shores of Newport Beach, California, building a bond empire at a company called Pacific Investment Management Company, or PIMCO. Gross, who paid his way through business school with blackjack winnings after reADIng Ed Thorp’s book on gambling, was especially adept at predicting the direction of global interest rates. He became well known in the financial world for thoughtful, colorful market observations, as well as a unique look. Each day, Gross wore open-collared, custom-made dress shirts with a tie draped loosely around his neck, a style adopted after vigorous exercise and yoga sessions left him overheated and unwilling to knot his tie once in the office.
Like Simons, Gross used a mathematical approach to dissect his investments, though Gross melded his formulas with a heavy dose of intuition and intelligence. Gross emerged as a true market savantin 1995, after a huge wager on falling interest rates generated gains of 20 percent for his bond mutual fund, which became the largest ever of its kind. Investors crowned him “the Bond King”, a name that would stick as Gross began an extended reign atop debt markets.