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《The Man Who Solved The Market》中文版翻译连载44

投资者们不肯为文艺复兴投钱 认为用计算机主导投资的想法太荒谬

《The Man Who Solved The Market》中文版翻译连载44
解决市场的人

The MAn Who Solved The Market (47)

CHAPTER EIGHT
第八章

Jim Simons’s pulse quickened as he approAChed Sixth Avenue.

吉姆·西蒙斯走近第六大道时,他的心跳加快了。

It was a sultry summer afternoon, but Simons wore a jacket and tie, hoping to impress. He had his work cut out for him. By 1991, David Shaw and a few other upstarts were using computer models to trade stocks. Those few members of the Wall Street establishment aware of the approach mostly scoffed at it, however. Relying on inscrutable algorithms, as Simons was doing, seemed ludicrous, even dangerous. Some called it black box investing — hard to explain and likely masking serious risk. Huge sums of money were being made the old-fashioned way, blending thoughtful resEArch with honed instincts. Who needed Simons and his fancy computers?

这是一个闷热的夏日午后,但是西蒙斯穿了西装还打了领带,希望能给人留下深刻印象。他有自己的工作要做。到1991年,大卫·肖和其他新贵都开始采用计算机模型进行股票交易。然而,注意到这种做法的少数华尔街人士却对此嗤之以鼻。就像西蒙斯一样,依靠高深莫测的算法看起来是很荒唐的,甚至是危险的。一些人称之为“黑匣子投资”——很难解释,可能又掩盖了风险。大量的钱都是通过深思熟虑的调研和磨练出来的直觉相结合的传统方式获得的。谁还需要西蒙斯和他的电脑呢?

Awaiting Simons in a tall midtown Manhattan office tower was Donald Sussman, a forty-fIVe-year-old Miami native who was something of a heretic on Wall Street. More than two decades earlier, as an undergraduate at Colombia UniveRSIty, Sussman took a leave of absence to work in a small brokerage firm. There, he stumbled upon an obscure strategy to trade convertible bonds, a particularly knotty investment. Sussman convinced his bosses to shell out $2,000 for an early-generation electronic calculator so he could quickly determine which bond was most attractive. Calculator in hand, Sussman made the firm millions of dollars in profits, a windfall that opened his eyes to how technology could render an advantage.

45岁的迈阿密人唐纳德·萨斯曼正在曼哈顿中城的一座高大的办公楼里等待西蒙斯,他在华尔街算得上是个异。在20多年前,萨斯曼在哥伦比亚大学读本科时,曾请假去一家小型经纪公司工作。在那里,他偶然发现了一种模糊策略进行可转换债交易,这是一种特别棘手的投资。萨斯曼说服了他的老板花2000美元买了一个早期的电子计算器,这样他就能快速决定哪些债券更有吸引力。萨斯曼手里拿着计算器,为公司赚取了几百万美元的利润,这笔意外之财让他看清了科技是如何带来优势的。

Now the six-foot-three, broad-shouldered, mustachioed Sussman ran a fund called Paloma Partners that was backing Shaw’s rapidly expanding hedge-fund firm, D.E.Shaw. Sussman suspected mathematicians and scientists might one day rival, or even best, the largest trADIng firms, no matter the conventional wisdom in the business. Word was out that he was open to investing in additional computer-focused traders, giving Simons hope he might gain Sussman’s support.

现在这位六英尺三寸高、宽肩膀、留着大胡子的萨斯曼运营着一只叫做Paloma Parterners的基金,正是它支持了肖快速扩张的对冲基金——D.E.Shaw。无论业界的传统看法如何,萨斯曼怀疑数学家和科学家有一天会与最大的交易公司成为对手,甚至是最好的对手。有消息说,他愿意为专注于计算机的交易员投资更多,这也给了西蒙斯希望,他可能会得到萨斯曼的支持。

Simons had discarded a thriving academic career to do something special in the investing world. But, after a full decade in the business, he was managing barely more than $45 million, a mere quarter the assets of Shaw’s firm. The meeting had import — backing from Sussman could help Renaissance hire employees, upgrade technology, and become a force on Wall Street.

西蒙斯放弃了蒸蒸日上的学术生涯,想要在投资界作出成绩。但是,在行业里做了整整十年后,他管理着不到4500万美元的资产,这仅仅是肖的公司资产的四分之一。这次会议意义重大——得到萨斯曼的支持可以帮助文艺复兴公司雇佣更多员工、升级技术,并成为华尔街的一股力量。

Sussman had been one of Simons’s earliest investors, but he suffered losses and withdrew his money, an experience that suggested Sussman might be skeptical of his visitor. Simons’s trading algorithms had recently been revamped, however, and he was bursting with confidence. He strode into Sussman’s building, a block from Carnegie Hall, rode an elevator to the thirty-first floor, and stepped into an expansive conference room with panoramic views of Central Park and a large white board for visiting Quants to scribble their equations.

萨斯曼曾是西蒙斯最早期的投资者之一,但是亏损严重并撤回了资金,这一经历表明萨斯曼对他的访客持怀疑态度。然而,西蒙斯的交易算法近期已经完善过,他对此非常有信心。他大步走进萨斯曼所在的大厦,大厦距离卡内基音乐厅仅一个街区远,西蒙斯搭乘电梯来到了31层,走进一间宽敞的会议室,这里不仅可以看到中央公园的全景,还有一块大白板,可供来访的宽客们书写方程式。

Eyeing Simons across a long, narrow wooden table, Sussman couldn’t help smiling. His guest was bearded, balding, and graying, bearing little resemblance to most of the investors who made regular pilgrimages to his office asking for money. Simons’s tie was slightly askew, and his jacket tweed, a rarity on Wall Street. He came alone, without the usual entourage of handlers and advisors. Simons was just the kind of brainy investor Sussman enjoyed helping.

萨斯曼看着西蒙斯穿过长长的、狭窄的木制桌子,他忍不住笑起来。他的客人蓄着胡子,长着灰白色的头发已经开始秃顶,和大多数定期来办公室要钱的投资者没有任何相似之处。西蒙斯的领带有点歪,西服也是皱皱的,这在华尔街实属罕见。他独自一人,没带通常的随行人员和顾问。西蒙斯正是萨斯曼乐于帮助的那种有头脑的投资者。

“He looked like an academic,” Sussman recalls.

“他看起来像个学者,”萨斯曼回忆说。

Simons began his pitch, relaying how his Medallion hedge fund had refined its approach. Assured and plainspoken, Simons spent more than an hour outlining his firm’s performance, risks, and volatility, and he broadly described his new short-term model.

西蒙斯开始了宣讲,主要讲了他的大奖章对冲基金是如何改善策略的。西蒙斯自信又直言不讳,花了一个多小时来介绍公司的业绩、风险波动性,并大致描述了他的新的短期操作模式。

“Now I really have it,” Simons enthused. “We’ve had a breakthrough.”

“现在已经完成了,”西蒙斯充满热情的说。“我们已经取得了突破。”

He asked Sussman for a $10 million investmentin his hedge fund, expressing certainty he could generate big gains and grow Renaissance into a major investment firm.

他要求萨斯曼向他的对冲基金投资1000万美元,表示他肯定能获得巨额收益,并决心将文艺复兴公司发展成为一家大型投资公司。

“I’ve had a revelation,” Simons said. “I can do it in size.”

“我已经得到了启示,”西蒙斯说,“我可以按照规模操作。”

Sussman listened patiently. He was impressed. There was no way he was giving Simons any money, though. Privately, Sussman worried about potential conflicts of interests, since he was the sole source of capital for Shaw’s hedge fund. He was even helping Shaw’s firm hire academics and traders to extend its lead over Simons and other fledging quantitative traders. If Sussman had cash to spare, he figured, he probably should put it in D.E.Shaw. Besides, Shaw was scoring annual gains of 40 percent. Renaissance didn’t seem to have a shot at matching those gains.

萨斯曼耐心地听着。印象非常深刻。然而他并不会给西蒙斯投资。私下里,萨斯曼有点担心相关利益冲突,因为他是肖的对冲基金的唯一资金来源。他甚至帮助肖的公司雇佣学者和交易员,来扩大对西蒙斯和其他羽翼未丰的量化交易员的领先优势。如果萨斯曼还有多余的钱他会投资给D.E.Shaw。此外,肖的年收益率为40%。而文艺复兴似乎没机会再赶上这个增长了。

“Why would I give money to a theoretical competitor?” Sussman asked Simons. “I’m sorry, but I already have David.”

“我为什么要投钱给一个理论上的竞争者?”萨斯曼问西蒙斯,“对不起,我已经投了大卫了。”

They stood up, shook hands, and promised tostay in touch. As Simons turned to leave, Sussman noticed a fleeting look ofdisappointment on his face.

他们站起来,握手,承诺会保持联系。但当西蒙斯转身离开的时候,萨斯曼注意到他脸上掠过一丝失望的表情。

Simons didn’t have much more luck with other potential backers. Investors wouldn’t say it to his face, but most deemed it absurd to rely on trading models generated by computers. Just as preposterous were Simons’s fees, especially his requirement that investors hand over 5 percent of the money he managed for them each year, well above the 2 percent levied by most hedge funds.

西蒙斯在其他潜在支持者那里也没什么好运气。投资者们不会当着他面说,但是大部分人认为认为依靠计算机生成的交易模型是荒谬的。同样荒谬的是西蒙斯的收费,他每年向投资者收取管理资金的5%作为管理费,远高于其他对冲基金收取的2%。

“I pay the fees, too,” Simons told one potential investor, noting that he also was an investor in Medallion. “Why shouldn’t you?”

“我也交管理费,”西蒙斯跟一位潜在投资者说,特别指出他也是大奖章基金的一名投资者。“你为什么不呢?”

Simons didn’t get very far with that logic; the fees he paid went right back to his own firm, rendering his argument unconvincing. Simons was especially hamstrung by the fact that his fund had fewer than two years of impressive returns.

西蒙斯的逻辑不太讲得通;他付的管理费直接回到了自己的公司,这让他的理论没什么可信性。西蒙斯的基金只有不到两年取得了可观的回报,这一点让他受挫。

When a Wall Street veteran named Anita Rival met with Simons in his Manhattan office to discuss an investment from the firm she represented, she became the latest to snub him.

当一名叫安妮塔·里瓦尔的华尔街资深人士在西蒙斯曼哈顿的办公室里与他会面,代表她的公司讨论投资事宜,她成了最新一个冷落西蒙斯的人。

“He wouldn’t explain how the computer models worked,” she recalls. “You couldn’t understand what he was doing.”

“他不肯解释计算机模型是如何工作的,”她回忆道,“你也无法理解他在做什么。”

(免责声明:仅供个人阅读学习及翻译参考。如有不准之处,请留言帮助改进)

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